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This study systematically examines the ability of aggregate insider trading to
predict future market returns in the Chinese A-share market. After controlling
for the contrarian investment strategy, aggregate executive (large shareholder)
trading conducted over the past six months can predict 66% (72.7%) of market
returns twelve months in advance. Aggregate insider trading predicts future
market returns very accurately and is stronger for insiders who have a greater
information advantage (e.g., executives and controlling shareholders).
Corporate governance also aﬀects the predictability of insider trading. The
predictability of executive trading is weakest in central state-owned companies,
probably because the “quasi-oﬃcial” status of the executives in those
companies eﬀectively curbs their incentives to beneﬁt from insider trading.
The predictive power of large shareholder trading in private-owned companies
is higher than that in state-owned companies, probably due to their stronger
proﬁt motivation and higher involvement in business operations. This study
complements the literature by examining an emerging market and investigating
how the institutional context and corporate governance aﬀect insider trading.
 2014 Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of China Journal of
Accounting Research. Founded by Sun Yat-sen University and City
University of Hong Kong.Yat-sen
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Insiders include a company’s corporate oﬃcers, directors, supervisors (all referred to as “executives” here-
after) and large shareholders (those with ownership of 5% or more of the company’s stock). Insider trading
based on a superior information advantage can inﬂuence the eﬃciency and fairness of the ﬁnancial market,
and thus presents a thorny regulatory challenge.
When the Chinese A-share market was initially established, it had a dual share structure comprising trad-
able and non-tradable shares. Shares owned by large shareholders and executives were basically non-tradable
as they were prohibited from being traded on the secondary stock market. As such, insider trading was very
rare at that time. Since the end of 2005, with the market reform of non-tradable shares, market segmentation
between tradable and non-tradable shares has been gradually removed. To mitigate the supply pressure on the
secondary market, the reform prevented non-tradable shares from being sold immediately, and instituted a
lock-up period of one to three years. Some locked-up shares have been “lifted” since the beginning of
2007. By the end of 2011, almost all of the non-tradable shares became tradable and insiders began to trade
their stocks more frequently, a new occurrence that has attracted a lot of attention. The A-share market is still
emerging and its eﬃciency requires improvement. The quality of its corporate information disclosure is gen-
erally not high, its information intermediaries (analysts) have yet to mature and the information asymmetry
between insiders and outsiders is still relatively large. These limitations have undoubtedly provided insiders
with more trading opportunities. Furthermore, a regulatory system has not yet been developed, making insi-
der trading a potentially serious and complicated challenge.
Based on media reports, insiders from diﬀerent companies often trade in the same direction during the same
period. When the market index is high or rapidly rising, insiders often consistently decrease their holdings.
When the market index is in a slump, insiders often uniformly increase their holdings. The “mainstream”
aggregate insider trading matches “cleverly” with market movements, suggesting that it is ideal in terms of
market timing.
Using A-share market insider transaction data from January 2007 to August 2011, we empirically examine
the predictability of aggregate insider trading on market returns. We ﬁnd that after controlling for contrarian
trading, the past six months of aggregate executive (large shareholder) trading can predict 66% (72.7%) of
market returns twelve months in advance. We also examine the eﬀect of information hierarchy on predictive
power and ﬁnd that the predicative power of aggregate trading is signiﬁcantly higher for insiders with more
business operation involvement and a higher position in the information hierarchy (e.g., executives and con-
trolling shareholders) than for insiders with a lower position (e.g., supervisors and important shareholders).
This evidence strongly supports that an information advantage, beyond being a simple contrarian trading
strategy, is the root cause of the strong predictive power of aggregate insider trading. Stemming from their
high involvement in business operations, insiders can aggregately form a stronger ability to predict macroeco-
nomic trends and detect deviations in systematic valuation in the stock market (referred to as the “macro
information advantage”) and use this advantage when trading.
As a typical form of agency conﬂict, insider trading behavior is aﬀected systematically by corporate gov-
ernance (Gunny et al., 2008). Corporate governance aﬀects the information content of insider transactions
in two ways. First, the ownership structure aﬀects the distribution of control rights and decision-making
power between shareholders and executives, thus aﬀecting the information distribution and advantages of spe-
ciﬁc insiders. Second, insider trading behavior is monitored diﬀerently under diﬀerent corporate governance
structures, and corporate governance aﬀects the motives of insiders and thus the possibility that insiders will
use their information advantage in trading.
In this study, we examine the eﬀect of corporate governance on the predictive power of aggregate insider
trading. Depending on the nature of the largest shareholder’s ownership, companies can be divided into three
categories: private, local state-owned and central state-owned. Local state-owned companies are controlled by
the local State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). Central state-owned
companies are controlled by either the central SASAC or central government departments. These three types
of companies have systematically diﬀerent agency problems and governance structures. As investor protection
is weak in the A-share stock market, the largest shareholder in most privately owned companies has highly
concentrated ownership and even controlling ownership for self-protection purposes. Because these large
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managers, there is only a small agency conﬂict between shareholders and managers. However, the large private
shareholder has a strong incentive to expropriate the interests of small shareholders. He or she can gain lucra-
tive private beneﬁts of control via insider trading in the secondary market, related party transactions and the
pyramid shareholding structure. In state-owned companies, the ultimate shareholders can be traced up to local
or central SASAC, which always delegates bureaucrats as board chairmen, resulting in serious governance
problems such as investor phantoms and manager control. Management occupies a large number of seats
on these boards, creating a self-monitoring problem. Despite their high concentration of ownership, large state
shareholders have an information disadvantage due to their low participation in business operations. There
are also signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the central and local state-owned companies. Central state-owned com-
panies are usually super-large companies tightly controlled by the central SASAC in strategically important
industries, such as China Mobile, the four largest state-owned banks, China Petroleum and China Railway
Group. These large central state-owned companies tend to have a corresponding administrative hierarchy
and serve more political purposes, such as achieving ﬁnancial and price stability. For example, China Petro-
leum and China Petrochemical are ministerial-level companies and their executives often have “quasi-oﬃcial”
status along with opportunities for promotion to the provincial or ministerial government levels. Therefore,
these executives are under recessive but powerful government administrative control.
In this study, we examine how the nature of ownership aﬀects the predictive power of insider trading. We
ﬁnd that the predictive power of executive trading in central state-owned companies is the weakest. The
“quasi-oﬃcial” status of the executives in this type of company weakens its motivation to proﬁt through trad-
ing, forcing it to give up opportunities to trade based on an information advantage. The predictive power of
large shareholder trading in private-owned companies is signiﬁcantly higher than that in state-owned compa-
nies, as the shareholders in private-owned companies have a stronger proﬁt motivation and higher involve-
ment in business operations.
This study makes the following contributions to the insider trading literature. First, most of the literature has
focused on the information content of insider trading from amicro perspective. It has observed that insiders can
use their ﬁrm-level information advantage to time trades and that their trading activities can predict their com-
panies’ future stock movements. We examine the information content of aggregate insider trading from a
macro perspective and ﬁnd that aggregate insider trading can predict future market movements and that infor-
mation hierarchy and corporate governance aﬀect the predictability of aggregate insider trading. Second, most
insider trading studies focus on mature markets, especially the U.S. market, and provide limited insights into
emerging markets with diﬀerent institutional environments. This study complements previous studies by focus-
ing on an emerging market and provides interesting ﬁndings that are diﬀerent from those observed in mature
markets. The general ﬁnding in mature markets is that insider buying has higher information content than insi-
der selling and that large shareholder trading has lower information content than executive trading. However,
we obtain diﬀerent ﬁndings for the A-share market due to its diﬀerent institutional context and governance
structure. Third, this study expands the research related to how corporate governance aﬀects insider trading.
Insider trading activities are not only inﬂuenced by statutory laws and law enforcement at the national level,
but also aﬀected by corporate governance. The diverse types of corporate governance structures on the Chinese
A-share market provide an excellent setting for studying the eﬀects of corporate governance on insider trading.
Fourth, our ﬁndings provide valuable insights into forming investment strategies. As aggregate insider trading
has signiﬁcant power in predicting future stock returns, external investors can use insider trading activities to
forecast future stock movements. As the famous Chinese poem says, “Although winter wind blows briskly,
ducks forecast the coming of spring and begin to swim in the lake.”Much like swimming ducks help to forecast
the change in season, aggregate insider trading helps to predict the movement of the market.
2. Literature review
Insiders are special traders who possess highly accurate information at a very low access cost. Company
executives are more familiar with their own companies than any analyst on Wall Street. They know when
a new product will be launched, an inventory will begin to stack, proﬁt margins will expand or product costs
will improve. As Seyhun (1998) observes, if you want to ﬁnd smart investors, these are smart investors.
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will aﬀect stock prices. This type of advantage disappears after the events are announced, usually within a
short time. Furthermore, direct use of event-related inside information is often prohibited in many countries.
Second, insiders can better assess the company’s earnings prospects and growth potential than outsiders. This
type of information advantage is usually long term and does not rely on speciﬁc events. Third, insiders can
better assess the intrinsic value of a company than outsiders and can thus identify and exploit opportunities
when the stock market overvalues or undervalues the company. Fourth, insiders have a better sense of indus-
try and macro-economy trends and thus tend to predict future macroeconomic directions more accurately.
The ﬁrst three types of advantages can increase insiders’ ability to predict ﬁrm-level price movement more pre-
cisely. They seem to always be able to cash in when the price is high and purchase when the price is low. The
fourth advantage increases aggregate insiders’ ability to time the market.
Whether and how insiders use their information advantage to trade is the core issue of empirical studies.
These questions may be answered by analyzing the relationship between stock price movements and insider
trades, and examining the timing and proﬁtability of the trades. Studies with a micro perspective examine
the relationship between insider trades and the corresponding company’s stock price movements to verify
whether insiders use ﬁrm-level private information to trade. In contrast, studies with a macro perspective
examine the relationship between aggregate insider trading and future market movements to verify whether
insiders have an overall ability to time the market.
2.1. Micro perspective: can insider trades predict future stock returns?
The micro perspective widely involves the event study method to investigate a company’s share price move-
ments shortly before and after an insider trade is made to determine the insider’s ability to obtain abnormal
returns. Insiders accurately time trades over the short term (Friedrich et al., 2002). Furthermore, many studies
ﬁnd that insider trading can predict a company’s future long-term price movements. Stock prices tend to go up
(down) in the long run after insider purchases (sales) are made. This predictability suggests that insiders
exploit important private information in advance that aﬀects future stock prices (Givoly and Palmon, 1985;
Seyhun, 1998; Pettit and Venkatesh, 1995; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Jeng et al., 2003; Ravina and
Sapienza, 2010).
Research has veriﬁed in diﬀerent ways that an information advantage accounts for the accurate timing and
abnormal returns associated with insider trades. The proﬁtability of insider trades is closely related to the
information hierarchy that insiders belong to; the higher the information hierarchy, the higher the proﬁtabil-
ity. In the U.S., large shareholders’ trading proﬁtability is found to be signiﬁcantly lower than that of execu-
tives. Because large shareholders often do not own large proportions of the shares and are rarely directly
involved in business decisions, they have less of an information advantage than executives (Lakonishok
and Lee, 2001). Even executives have an information hierarchy, with CEOs at the top, other managers in
the middle and board directors at the bottom. The trading proﬁtability of diﬀerent groups is positively corre-
lated with such an information hierarchy (Seyhun, 1998). However, Jeng et al. (2003) ﬁnd that although CEOs
have more information, their trading activities are more likely to be monitored by shareholders and regulators,
and therefore their trading proﬁtability is not necessarily signiﬁcantly higher than that of other managers. In
addition, studies consistently ﬁnd that the proﬁtability of executives’ sales is weaker than that of purchases.
Executives’ purchases are mainly based on private information. In contrast, with the popularity of equity
incentives, executives often sell stocks to meet liquidity or diversiﬁcation needs, and this non-information-dri-
ven selling dilutes the overall information content for sales.
2.2. Macro perspective: can aggregate insider trading predict future market trends?
There is some evidence that aggregate insider trading coincides with market price movements. Seyhun
(1990) ﬁnds through a case study that shortly after the stock market crash in October 1987, insiders aggre-
gately purchased shares and accurately predicted the market rebound. Seyhun (1992) also ﬁnds that during
1975–1989, the net insiders’ purchase index of the past 12 months predicted 16% (61%) of the next 6 (12)
months of market returns. It seems that when future market returns are positive (negative), aggregate insider
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net purchase measures and control for the eﬀects of a simple contrarian strategy. They also ﬁnd that aggregate
insider trading can accurately predict future market returns. The one-year-ahead market return gap between
the months with the highest and lowest net purchases index is about 11%, and the aggregate trading of exec-
utives exhibits better predictability than that of large shareholders. Overall, empirical studies show that aggre-
gate insider trading is an important leading indicator of future stock market movements and can accurately
predict future market returns.
Why does aggregate insider trading eﬀectively predict future market trends? Seyhun (1998) ﬁnds that insid-
ers as a group can correctly anticipate the direction of the future real economy and react to changes in future
economic trends nearly a year ahead of the stock market. Jiang and Zaman (2007) study the causes of aggre-
gate insider trading’s predictability of future market returns and ﬁnd that although such trading is strongly
correlated with cash ﬂow information unexpected by the market, expected cash ﬂow information does not lead
to large waves of insider trading. These studies suggest that aggregate insider trading is not simply contrarian
trading, but is rather based on insiders’ eﬀective assessment of future macroeconomic trends.
Most of the research on China focuses on the micro perspective. Studies consistently ﬁnd that insider trades
can predict both short- and long-term stock movements, and that insiders have the ability to time trades and
earn high abnormal returns. In terms of executive trading, researchers ﬁnd that executive sales can predict the
fall of a company’s stock price within a short time window (Zeng, 2008; Zhang and Zeng, 2011). Zhu et al.
(2011a,b) investigate the long-term proﬁtability of executive trading and ﬁnd that executive sales and pur-
chases exhibit a strong predictability of stock price movement six months in advance. In terms of large share-
holder trading, studies also ﬁnd that large shareholder sales are accurately timed within a short window (Zhu
et al., 2011a,b; Cai and Wei, 2009; Lin and Qu, 2010; Wu and Wu, 2010; Shen et al., 2011). However, the tim-
ing ability of shareholder purchases is not obvious and purchase activities are not strongly correlated with
future performance indicators (Li et al., 2011).
These Chinese studies have adopted the micro perspective and often focus on executives or large sharehold-
ers as a single group, or on “buy or sell” as a one-way transaction. This is the ﬁrst study to examine the infor-
mation content of aggregate insider trading in the Chinese A-share stock market from a macro perspective. It
comprehensively compares the information content of trades in diﬀerent directions and trades made by diﬀer-
ent types of insiders, and oﬀers in-depth analysis of how information hierarchies and corporate governance
aﬀect the information content of insider trading.
3. Research hypotheses
At ﬁrst glance, the public and insiders both observe the same changes in macroeconomic policies. Although
insiders have more private company information, it seems that they should only be able to predict the stock
movement of their own companies. Insiders have no additional advantage overall for predicting stock market
movement.
In fact, insiders at the front line of operations can often perceive macroeconomic trend changes earlier. For
example, they can observe changes in inﬂation earlier through company material and product price move-
ments. In contrast, the public has to wait until the end of the month for such inﬂation statistics to be released.
More importantly, even if insiders and the public were to observe the same macroeconomic policy changes,
based on their experience with business operations, insiders have a deeper understanding of the eﬀect of
changes on the company, the industry and future macroeconomic performance. Thus, insiders have better
analytical capabilities than outside investors in interpreting macroeconomic information. For example,
although insiders and the public observe the same changes in interest rates, insiders can better interpret the
eﬀect of the changes on the company and industry’s future performance. Without knowing the company’s spe-
ciﬁc ﬁnancing structure, outsiders would have diﬃculty calculating the eﬀect of the changes on the company’s
proﬁt (Seyhun, 1992). As insiders are involved at the forefront of business operations, they are able to detect
macro and industry changes earlier and more accurately interpret the eﬀect of these changes on the future per-
formance of the company, industry and macro-economy, and can better predict future market movement and
follow their predictions when trading. Seyhun (1998) ﬁnds that insider trading can reﬂect future changes in the
real economy one year earlier than the stock market.
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detect systemic bias in their stock market valuations. Because investors can be emotional and irrational at
times, the market sometimes systematically overvalues or undervalues stocks, providing uniform opportunities
for insider trades. In an overheated bull market, when the prices of most stocks are high, the insiders of dif-
ferent companies appear to decrease their holdings uniformly and thus pool into selling waves. The market
eventually returns to rational valuations in the future, resulting in negative future market returns. Insiders also
conversely take advantage of systematic market undervaluations to uniformly increase holdings. Aggregate
insider trading reacts to both systematic market overvaluations and undervaluations.
In summary, insiders have an evident information advantage when predicting macroeconomic movements
and detecting systematic deviations in market valuation. This macro information advantage is not a result of
insiders obtaining macro private information (e.g., changes in interest rates) sooner than outsiders. Rather, it
stems from insiders’ high involvement in business operations, which gives them a superior ability to analyze
and interpret macro information, predict macroeconomic trends and identify systematic deviations in market
valuation. Most insiders use their macro information advantage when trading and aggregate insider trading
can be used to predict future market movements.
The predictability of aggregate insider trading is not a simple summary of insiders’ ability to time trades
based on private ﬁrm-level information. Assuming that insiders use only ﬁrm-level information to trade, dif-
ferent companies would report good and bad news during the same period. As such, insiders from diﬀerent
companies would make purchases and sales at the same time, and therefore the aggregated trading should
be zero. However, if the majority of the insiders uniformly choose to buy or sell during the same period, it
is likely that the information they are using is based on their prediction of future macro-level movements.
Hypothesis 1. Aggregate insider trading can predict future market movements and this predictability reﬂects
insiders’ macro information advantage.
Insiders are divided into two major categories: large shareholders and executives. Large shareholders can be
subdivided into the largest shareholder and important shareholders (more than 5% stock ownership but
excluding the largest shareholder). Executives can be subdivided into board directors, managers and supervi-
sors. There are signiﬁcant diﬀerences in operational involvement and the level of information advantage
among insiders. The largest shareholders have an important inﬂuence on strategic decisions and can directly
appoint directors and managers. Therefore, their operational involvement and level of information advantage
are stronger than those of important shareholders. Among executives, directors (especially non-executive and
independent directors) are mainly responsible for monitoring managers and making strategic decisions.
Because they meet only a few times a year, their involvement in business operations and thus their information
advantage is less than that of managers. Chinese companies normally add another position to the executives
group: that is supervisors, whose primary responsibility is to perform a compliance check after major decisions
are made. Most supervisors are staﬀ delegates or outside retired persons working part time. Thus, their oper-
ational involvement is signiﬁcantly less than that of managers and directors (Zhu et al., 2011a,b).
Insiders’ macro information advantage stems from their superior ability to interpret macro information
and predict macroeconomic trends as a result of their high involvement in business operations. Therefore,
the more insiders are involved in business operations and the higher their position in the information hierarchy
(e.g., largest shareholders and managers), the more obvious their macro-information advantage and the stron-
ger the predictive power of their trading activities for future market returns.
Hypothesis 2 (information hierarchy hypothesis). The aggregate trading of insiders with higher levels of
operational involvement and information hierarchy positions (e.g., largest shareholders and managers) has
more predictive power for future market returns than that of insiders with lower information hierarchy
positions (e.g., important shareholders and supervisors).
As a type of agency conﬂict and wealth misappropriation, insider trading is aﬀected by corporate gover-
nance. The essence of corporate governance is to limit insiders’ self-interest behavior and motivate them to
maximize the wealth of their companies through a variety of formal and informal control mechanisms
(Gunny et al., 2008). Good corporate governance can help decrease illegal trades and the inappropriate use
of an information advantage. At the company level, corporate governance can reinforce the advance approval
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lockout period before news announcements and impose harsh punishments for rule violations. Ravina and
Sapienza (2010) conﬁrm that corporate governance can signiﬁcantly aﬀect the proﬁtability of insider trades.
Although insiders of companies with good corporate governance are not able to obtain signiﬁcant abnormal
returns, those of companies with poor corporate governance can obtain abnormal returns up to a level of 21%.
Fidrmuc et al. (2006) ﬁnd that the information content of executive trading for companies with external large
shareholder oversight is less than that for companies with dispersed ownership.
In the Chinese A-share market, executive trading is dominated by sales. Executives’ excessive sales can have
a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on stock prices and market conﬁdence and can be detrimental to the interests of
large shareholders. In addition, due to the historical low popularity of equity incentives, original executive
holdings are normally low and large decreases in executive holdings decrease the congruence of interest
between executives and shareholders, weakening large shareholders’ control over executives and increasing
agency conﬂicts. Therefore, large shareholders must control the decreases in executive holdings within an
acceptable range.
The largest shareholders play a key oversight role in executive trading. In private-owned companies, the
largest shareholders are more concerned about their own interests and stock prices, and are more willing
and have a stronger ability to explicitly or implicitly control executives’ excessive sales and illegal trading. This
may constrain executives’ freedom to exploit their information advantage when trading. Rather, due to
investor phantoms and insider control, shareholders’ oversight of executive trading is relatively weak in
state-owned companies and thus self-interested executive trading is expected to be more serious than that
in private-owned companies.
State-owned companies can be further separated into central and local state-owned companies. Despite the
weak oversight of their large shareholders, central state-owned companies have a strong alternative adminis-
trative control over executives. Executives of central state-owned companies have the status of quasi-govern-
ment oﬃcials. The appointment, promotion and demotion of these executives occur under a strict and opaque
administrative control system and are not determined by the professional market of corporate executives.
Character and integrity are important aspects of how executives are evaluated. Proﬁtable executive trading
may damage the reputation of political executives and their “clean” image, negatively aﬀecting their evalua-
tion by governmental organizations and thus their political futures. With this hidden but powerful adminis-
trative control, executives are likely to restrain their proﬁtable trading activities. Chen et al. (2011) provide
empirical evidence that supports this argument. They examine the executive stock options held by executives
in large red-chip state-owned companies listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (mainly central state-
owned companies). They ﬁnd that lucrative stock options are rarely exercised and state-owned executives give
up the opportunity to proﬁt legally from stock options. These executives face a number of “hidden rules.”
Because they are not only executives but also quasi-government oﬃcials, they must comply with a strict per-
sonnel system designed for “cadres.” As a result, the quasi-government oﬃcial role of these executives is
expected to weaken their motive to trade for proﬁt, forcing them to give up opportunities to use their infor-
mation advantages (including their macro information advantage) when trading. This in turn decreases the
predictive power of aggregate executive trading in central state-owned companies.
Several expectations arise. In local state-owned companies, especially those below the provincial level, exec-
utives are more akin to professional managers with fewer “hidden” administrative rules to follow. In addition,
because large shareholder oversight of the management in this type of company is relatively weak, executive
trading in local state-owned companies is higher than executive trading in private- and central state-owned
companies. Executives in local state-owned companies are more likely to exploit their information advantage
when trading, including their macro information advantage. Consequently, the aggregate trading of these
executives has the highest predictive power.
Hypothesis 3 (effect of corporate governance on executive trading predictability). The executive trading of local
state-owned companies has the highest predictive power due to ineffective large shareholder and
administrative oversight of these executives. In contrast, the executive trading of central state-owned
companies has the lowest predictive power, as the “quasi-ofﬁcial” status of these executives limits their
motivation to proﬁt from their information advantage.
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signiﬁcant diﬀerences among the large shareholders of state-owned versus private-owned companies in terms
of interest orientation and operational involvement. These diﬀerences can signiﬁcantly aﬀect the motivation
and ability of large shareholders who are trading for proﬁt. Large shareholders of private-owned companies
have a stronger motivation to beneﬁt from trading in the secondary market. In contrast, large shareholders of
state-owned companies cannot truly retain any proﬁt gained from trading. Because the proﬁts are delivered to
the SASAC, the large shareholders’ motivation to trade for proﬁt is weaker than that of private-owned share-
holders. In addition, because large shareholders of central state-owned companies have political objectives,
they cannot focus only on proﬁtability goals when trading. For example, during the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis, large
central state-owned listed companies actively responded to the call for maintaining ﬁnancial market stability
by increasing their holdings of listed companies. This type of “politically driven” purchase is not proﬁt driven.
The central government also requires state-owned shareholders to preserve their controlling holdings in stra-
tegically important industries and gradually phase out their holdings in non-strategic, competing industries.
Therefore, large shareholders of state-owned companies cannot be completely free in their trading decisions.
From the perspective of operational involvement, large shareholders of private-owned companies often serve
as executive directors or have family members serve as executive directors and managers so that they can be
actively involved in major strategic decisions and daily operations. In contrast, large shareholders of state-
owned companies often delegate their control and decision-making authority to managers and indirectly
acquire their information advantage from directors who are appointed to the companies. From both perspec-
tives of proﬁt motivation and operational involvement, large shareholders of private-owned companies have
more incentives to time their trading and maximize returns based on their ability to predict future macroeco-
nomic trends and identify systematic market value deviations.
Hypothesis 4 (effect of corporate governance on trading predictability of large shareholders). Due to the greater
operational involvement and stronger proﬁt motivation, trades made by large shareholders of private-owned
companies have a higher predictive power than those made by large shareholders of state-owned companies.4. Sample selection and descriptive statistics
4.1. Sample selection
From a macro perspective, this study examines the ability of aggregate insider trading to predict future
market returns based on trading data taken from the Chinese A-share market during January 2007 to August
2011. We measure market returns based on the Shanghai Stock Exchange A-share Index. We obtained exec-
utive trading data from the Exchange website.1 After removing executive transactions below 20,000 yuan and
adding up multiple transactions made by the same executive on the same day, 9384 transactions remained in
the ﬁnal sample of executive transactions. Large shareholder trading data were taken from the Wind database.
We began by manually coding the ownership nature of large shareholder transactions. We also diﬀerentiated
controlling shareholders from other important shareholders. Controlling shareholders include the largest
shareholder and ultimate owner, and other important shareholders include shareholders with more than a
5% stock ownership (non-controlling shareholders) and shareholders who are closely related to the controlling
shareholder, even if they have less than 5% ownership. For the large shareholder transaction data, we deleted
transactions through a block trading platform2 and retained transactions through the secondary market. We1 Data are available on the Exchange’s website under “Listed Company Creditability Records” and in the column titled “Directors,
Supervisors and Managers Changes in Holdings of Company Shares.”
2 On April 20, 2008, the Commission issued its “Guidance on Transferring Lifted Restrictive Shares of Listed Company,” which requires
that certain lifted restrictive shares be traded through the stock exchange block trading system when the trading shares in a month are
projected to be more than 1% of the total shares. The block trading platform system is diﬀerent from the secondary market’s centralized
auction trading system. Membership is required to participate in the block trading platform system. The transaction time is limited to
weekdays from 15:00 to 15:30. The participants are mostly institutions and large shareholders. A transaction application is required and
the trading price is not included in the market index. Because only a few entities are involved, the block trading platform system is not
active and lacks liquidity.
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from the transaction’s start to end). There are 5553 shareholder transactions in the ﬁnal sample. Due to
the large diﬀerence in transaction scale, we examine the executive and shareholder trading samples separately.
4.2. Empirical model
We measure aggregate insider trading using the net purchase ratio (NPR). First, based on the month of the
transaction, we combine all of the executive (large shareholder) buying and selling transactions conducted
within the same month to obtain the total monthly purchases (BUYk) and sales (SELLk) amounts for the exec-
utives (large shareholder). Using the following formula, we then calculate the NPR:NPR6t ¼
Pt
k¼t5BUYk 
Pt
k¼t5SELLkPt
k¼t5BUYk þ
Pt
k¼t5SELLk
ð1ÞNPR6 aggregates the insider trading activities performed over the past six months. It is a comprehensive
macro-level indicator, calculated as the net of the buying and selling amount divided by the total amount
of the two types of activities. NPR can be calculated for three, six or twelve months. We mainly provide
the results for six months (NPR6). NPR6 is calculated for executives and large shareholders separately.
According to our hypothesis, NPR6i will be calculated for a speciﬁc subgroup of companies or subclass of
insiders (i), such as NPR6-private, which is calculated using only the trading data from private-owned
companies.
We use a model similar to that used by Lakonishok and Lee (2001). The model controls for the reversal
feature of market returns over a long period to more accurately measure whether aggregate insider trading
has incremental predictive power for future market returns. Our model also controls for the inertia feature
of market returns within a short interval.
The model is equated as follows:FR6it ¼ aþ bNPRit þ vBR6it þ dBR12it þ et
FR6it ¼
Ytþ6
k¼tþ1
ð1þ RikÞ 
Ytþ6
k¼tþ1
ð1þ Rfk Þ; BR6it ¼
Yt
k¼t5
ð1þ RikÞ  1; BR12it ¼
Yt
k¼t11
ð1þ RikÞ  1where Rik is the return for group i in month k, calculated as the equally weighted average return for the group i
companies in month k, and Rfk is the central bank’s one-year benchmark interest rate transferred into a
monthly rate and serves as a proxy for the risk-free rate. i can measure the entire market or a speciﬁc subgroup
of companies. FR6it represents group i’s cumulative abnormal returns over the next six months. The future
period can be three, nine or twelve months in duration (FR3, FR9 or FR12). This study shows the results
for FR6.
BR6it and BR12
i
t represent the abnormal returns for group i during the past six and twelve months, respec-
tively. We use BR6t to control for the market return inertia over the short term, and BR12t to control for the
market return reversal over the long term. NPRit represents the aggregated net insider trading for group i.
Our insider trading data covers January 2007 to August 2011. Although there would normally be 56 NPR6t
observations, because data are missing from the FR6 and FR12 calculations, the actual number of observa-
tions in the ﬁnal sample is less than 56.
4.3. Descriptive statistics
Fig. 1 shows the relationship between the aggregate insider trading NPR6 and the Shanghai A-share Index
trend during the sample period, and visually demonstrates that aggregate insider trading has the ability to time
the market. NPR6 is calculated for both the executives and large shareholders for each month. As seen in
Fig. 1, the two lines representing NPR6-Executive and NPR6-Shareholder are almost parallel to each other,
exhibiting similar trends. In addition, aggregate insider trading activities are inversely related to the market
index. When the market index is low (high) in a month, NPR6 increases (decreases). For example, during
September to December 2008, when the index drops to a historic low point of 2000, NPR6 for executives
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Figure 1. Aggregate insider trading NPR and the Shanghai A-share market index.
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NPR6 spikes again. In hindsight, we can see that insiders can successfully time the market when trading in
most cases.
Fig. 2 presents the relationship between aggregate insider trading NPR6 and future market returns FR6.
Net insider purchasing activities move in the same direction as future market returns consistently during
the sample period. When NPR6 increases, there is a corresponding increase in FR6. On the contrary, when
NPR6 is close to 1, FR6 is mostly negative. Therefore, the NPR6 indicator can eﬀectively predict future mar-
ket returns.
As shown in Table 1, there are 6925 executive sales transactions worth a total of 25.525 billion yuan and
2459 executive purchase transactions worth a total of 1.153 billion yuan. The ratio of purchases to sales is
1:22.14. On average, the amount for each selling transaction is also much higher than that for each purchasing
transaction. Therefore, executive sales are both much higher in terms of frequency and amount than
purchases.
As shown in Table 2, there are 5048 large shareholder sales transactions worth a total of 259.4 billion yuan
and only 505 purchase transactions worth a total of 16.27 billion yuan. The ratio of purchases to sales is
1:16.3. Furthermore, the amount for each sales transaction is higher than that for each purchase transaction.
The prevalence of sales and the inactivity of purchases in the A-share market is due to the removal of
restrictions on non-tradable shares.-1.2
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Figure 2. Aggregate insider trading NPR6 and future market returns FR6.
Table 1
Executive transaction analysis.
Number of transactions Amount of transactions (in 10,000 yuan) Number of shares (in 10,000 yuan)
Total Mean Median Std. Total Mean Median Std.
Sell 6925 2,552,541.50 368.60 46.07 1664.67 158,078.19 22.83 2.54 99.67
Buy 2459 115,301.84 46.89 10.55 255.05 9666.07 3.93 1.00 16.10
Table 2
Large shareholder transaction analysis.
Number of transactions Amount of transactions (in 10,000 yuan) Number of shares (in 10,000 yuan)
Total Mean Median Std. Total Mean Median Std.
Sell 5048 25,942,183.84 5139.10 2263.24 12245.41 2,099,230.67 415.85 200.00 910.54
Buy 505 1,627,165.94 3222.11 782.54 9211.89 195,252.42 386.64 100.15 1158.70
Note: Each large shareholder transaction announcement in the Wind database is counted as one transaction.
Table 3
Market returns and NPR analysis.
Market returns Aggregate executive trading Aggregate shareholder trading
FR6 FR9 FR12 BR6 BR12 NPR3 NPR6 NPR3 NPR6
Mean 0.005 0.027 0.072 0.117 0.329 0.696 0.718 0.847 0.848
Median 0.040 0.112 0.075 0.072 0.070 0.804 0.818 0.923 0.916
Std. 0.332 0.390 0.370 0.408 0.779 0.357 0.276 0.204 0.179
Min. 0.552 0.636 0.750 0.531 0.709 0.994 0.982 1.000 0.998
Max. 0.797 1.112 0.776 1.089 2.237 0.684 0.262 0.153 0.321
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is large due to the sudden switch from a bull market to a bear market during 2007–2011 and the long bear
market period since 2008. The means and medians of the aggregate executive and shareholder trades are
all negative, indicating net sales for both types of insiders. The NPRs are more negative for shareholders than
for executives, suggesting that net sales are relatively stronger for shareholders.
According to our hypothesis, NPR6 must be calculated for the subgroup of companies or subclass of
insiders. As shown in Table 4, the mean and median of NPR6-Manager are less negative than that of
NPR6-Director and NPR6-Supervisor, indicating that executive net sales are relatively weaker for managers.
Table 4 also shows that the mean and median of NPR6-Private are more negative than those of NPR6-Local
and NPR6-Central, indicating that executive net sales are stronger in private-owned companies. The mean and
median of NPR6 are similar for the three diﬀerent company sizes.
As reported in Table 5, the mean and median of NPR6-Important are more negative, indicating that the net
selling tendency is stronger for important shareholders than for controlling shareholders. Table 5 also reports
that the mean and median of NPR6-Private are more negative than those of NPR6-Local and NPR6-Central,
indicating that the net sales of large shareholders are stronger in private-owned companies than in state-owned
companies. The mean and median of NPR6 are similar for the three diﬀerent company sizes.Table 4
NPR for executive trading by executive type, ownership structure and company size.
Executive type Ownership structure Company size
NPR6-
Manager
NPR6-
Director
NPR6-
Supervisor
NPR6-
Private
NPR6-
Local
NPR6-
Central
NPR6-
Small
NPR6-
Medium
NPR6-
Large
Mean 0.485 0.753 0.744 0.765 0.385 0.434 0.741 0.690 0.711
Median 0.581 0.893 0.721 0.813 0.649 0.491 0.852 0.770 0.805
Std. 0.381 0.304 0.152 0.201 0.483 0.361 0.393 0.266 0.321
Min. 0.968 0.983 0.991 0.951 0.946 0.970 0.997 0.986 0.976
Max. 0.665 0.358 0.415 0.112 0.799 0.489 0.821 0.066 0.395
Note: NPR6-Manager is the net purchasing ratio for managers, calculated using only manager transaction data. NPR6-Director is the net
purchasing ratio for directors. NPR6-Supervisor is the net purchasing ratio for supervisors. NPR6-Private is the net purchasing ratio for
executives in private-owned companies. NPR6-Local is the net purchasing ratio for executives in local state-owned companies. NPR6-
Central is the net purchasing ratio for executives in central state-owned companies. NPR6-Small is the net purchasing ratio for executives
in small companies. NPR6-Medium is the net purchasing ratio for executives in medium-sized companies. NPR6-Large is the net
purchasing ratio for executives in large companies. A company’s size is determined by its market value (total shares * price per share) at
the beginning of each year. The companies are then evenly divided into three groups (small, medium and large) depending on their size.
Table 5
NPR for shareholder trading by shareholder type, ownership structure and company size.
Shareholder type Ownership structure Company size
NPR6-
Control
NPR6-
Important
NPR6-
Private
NPR6-
Local
NPR6-
Central
NPR6-
Small
NPR6-
Medium
NPR6-
Large
Mean 0.705 0.914 0.935 0.824 0.764 0.908 0.894 0.808
Median 0.859 0.945 0.967 0.876 0.875 0.942 0.947 0.889
Std. 0.424 0.086 0.091 0.173 0.302 0.131 0.127 0.224
Min. 0.996 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Max. 0.526 0.683 0.622 0.391 0.122 0.334 0.486 0.168
Note: NPR6-Control is the net purchasing ratio for controlling shareholders. NPR6-Important is the net purchasing ratio for important
shareholders. NPR6-Private is the net purchasing ratio for large shareholders in private-owned companies. NPR6-Local is the net
purchasing ratio for large shareholders in local state-owned companies. NPR6-Central is the net purchasing ratio for large shareholders in
central state-owned companies. NPR6-Small is the net purchasing ratio for large shareholders in small companies. NPR6-Medium is the
net purchasing ratio for large shareholders in medium-sized companies. NPR6-Large is the net purchasing ratio for large shareholders in
large companies.
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5.1. The information content of aggregate insider trading
Tables 6 and 7 examine the predictive power of aggregate executive trading for future market returns.
Table 6 does not control for historical market returns BR6 and BR12, and Table 7 does. In Table 6,
NPR6 explains 25% of FR6 and 58.4% of FR12. As such, aggregate executive trading exhibits fairly good pre-
dictive power for future market returns. In Table 7, after controlling for BR6 and BR12, NPR3 and NPR6
continue to provide signiﬁcant incremental explanatory power of future market returns, indicating that exec-
utives use their macro information advantage to time the market. When comparing the results of NPR3 and
NPR6, we can see that the t statistics and Adj-R2 values are higher for NPR6 than NPR3. Therefore, aggre-
gation over the longer term increases the predictability of insider trading.
Furthermore, according to Table 7, as the forecast period is extended from three to twelve months, the pre-
dictability of NPR increases, which is reﬂected in the increasing NPR t statistics and Adj-R2 values. It is worth
mentioning that the NPR6 model explains 66.9% of FR12. The coeﬃcients of BR6 are signiﬁcantly positive in
all of the models, consistent with the short-term market inertia explanation. All of the BR12 coeﬃcients are
signiﬁcantly negative, consistent with the long-term market reversal explanation.
Tables 8 and 9 exhibit the power of aggregate shareholder trading to predict future market returns. Regard-
less of whether BR6 and BR12 are controlled for, the NPR coeﬃcients are consistently signiﬁcantly positive in
all of the models, indicating that aggregate shareholder trading has a signiﬁcant ability to predict future mar-Table 6
Aggregate executive trading and future market returns without controlling for BR6 and BR12.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FR3 FR6 FR9 FR12 FR3 FR6 FR9 FR12
Intercept 0.0175 0.173* 0.338*** 0.323*** 0.146* 0.440*** 0.631*** 0.631***
(0.28) (1.79) (3.28) (3.56) (1.90) (3.99) (5.57) (6.82)
NPR3 0.0187 0.256** 0.534*** 0.593***
(0.23) (2.07) (4.01) (4.96)
NPR6 0.197* 0.619*** 0.932*** 1.020***
(1.97) (4.32) (6.24) (8.19)
Adj. R2 0.018 0.058 0.231 0.334 0.052 0.250 0.431 0.584
F 0.05 4.27 16.04 24.62 3.90 18.67 38.93 67.06
N 54 54 51 48 54 54 51 48
* Signiﬁcance at the level of 10% or less.
** Signiﬁcance at the level of 5% or less.
*** Signiﬁcance at the level of 1% or less.
Table 7
Aggregate executive trading and future market returns controlling for BR6 and BR12.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FR3 FR6 FR9 FR12 FR3 FR6 FR9 FR12
Intercept 0.0772 0.274*** 0.415*** 0.317*** 0.202*** 0.521*** 0.675*** 0.579***
(1.32) (3.19) (4.40) (3.81) (2.94) (5.65) (6.56) (6.68)
NPR3 0.115 0.403*** 0.623*** 0.484***
(1.42) (3.39) (4.68) (4.00)
NPR6 0.295*** 0.750*** 0.986*** 0.873***
(3.11) (5.90) (6.79) (6.89)
BR6 0.385*** 0.716*** 0.679*** 0.377** 0.375*** 0.659*** 0.579*** 0.294**
(3.74) (4.74) (4.10) (2.58) (3.99) (5.25) (4.16) (2.54)
BR12 0.115** 0.249*** 0.295*** 0.311*** 0.090* 0.195*** 0.230*** 0.236***
(2.16) (3.21) (3.47) (4.07) (1.79) (2.90) (3.08) (3.71)
Adj. R2 0.181 0.326 0.414 0.496 0.286 0.511 0.567 0.669
F 4.91 9.54 12.79 16.44 8.08 19.47 22.81 32.72
N 54 54 51 48 54 54 51 48
Note: The dependent variable FR3 (FR6, FR9, FR12) represents the three-month-ahead (six-month-ahead, nine-month-ahead, twelve-
month-ahead) cumulative abnormal return of the Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Index. The independent variable NPR3 (NPR6) is
the net purchasing ratio for executives over the past three (six) months. The control variables BR6 and BR12 represent the cumulative
abnormal market returns for the past six and twelve months, respectively. The t values of the coeﬃcients are included in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcance at the level of 10% or less.
** Signiﬁcance at the level of 5% or less.
*** Signiﬁcance at the level of 1% or less.
Table 8
Aggregate shareholder trading and future market returns without controlling for BR6 and BR12.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FR3 FR6 FR9 FR12 FR3 FR6 FR9 FR12
Intercept 0.0211 0.368* 0.754*** 0.908*** 0.307** 0.865*** 1.291*** 1.307***
(0.17) (1.94) (3.75) (5.63) (2.34) (4.64) (7.22) (9.52)
NPR3 0.0196 0.440** 0.923*** 1.162***
(0.14) (2.03) (4.00) (6.27)
NPR6 0.357** 1.025*** 1.556*** 1.637***
(2.35) (4.77) (7.54) (10.28)
Adj. R2 0.019 0.055 0.230 0.449 0.079 0.291 0.528 0.690
F 0.02 4.10 15.97 39.26 5.55 22.77 56.84 105.75
N 54 54 51 48 54 54 51 48
* Signiﬁcance at the level of 10% or less.
** Signiﬁcance at the level of 5% or less.
*** Signiﬁcance at the level of 1% or less.
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twelve months). The NPR6 model explains almost 73% of the variation in FR12, suggesting that aggregate
large shareholder trading has a strong ability to predict future market returns.
The ﬁndings shown in Tables 8 and 9 diﬀer from prior empirical evidence identiﬁed for the U.S. market.
Literature focusing on the U.S. market has unanimously found that large shareholder transactions have
low information content, mainly because ownership is more dispersed and the holdings of large shareholders
are generally low in the U.S. market. Large shareholders are usually not involved in business operations, but
rely on compensation contracts, the corporate management job market, independent directors and other
means to indirectly control management. As such, they are mostly passive shareholders and have a much
weaker information advantage than executives. However, due to the lack of investor protection in the Chinese
A-share market, concentrated ownership is an alternative for shareholders’ self-protection. Furthermore, due
to the imperfections that corporate managers and independent directors face in the job market and other
Table 9
Aggregate shareholder trading and future market returns controlling for BR6 and BR12.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FR3 FR6 FR9 FR12 FR3 FR6 FR9 FR12
Intercept 0.221* 0.720*** 1.017*** 0.888*** 0.517*** 1.186*** 1.510*** 1.233***
(1.71) (3.85) (4.87) (5.16) (4.12) (7.42) (8.88) (8.18)
NPR3 0.272* 0.878*** 1.241*** 1.087***
(1.72) (3.85) (4.85) (5.12)
NPR6 0.637*** 1.451*** 1.847*** 1.520***
(4.17) (7.45) (8.89) (8.16)
BR6 0.402*** 0.761*** 0.722*** 0.440*** 0.370*** 0.642*** 0.549*** 0.274**
(3.88) (5.10) (4.35) (3.22) (4.20) (5.71) (4.61) (2.60)
BR12 0.102* 0.211*** 0.246*** 0.268*** 0.0474 0.106* 0.122* 0.162**
(1.91) (2.74) (2.87) (3.73) (0.96) (1.68) (1.81) (2.66)
Adj. R2 0.196 0.360 0.428 0.569 0.368 0.607 0.680 0.727
F 5.29 10.95 13.47 21.71 11.28 28.30 36.39 42.67
N 54 54 51 48 54 54 51 48
Note: FR3 (FR6, FR9, FR12) is the three-month-ahead (six-month-ahead, nine-month-ahead, twelve-month-ahead) cumulative abnormal
return of the Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Index. NPR3 (NPR6) is the net purchasing ratio for large shareholders over the past
three (six) months. BR6 and BR12 represent cumulative abnormal market returns for the past six and twelve months, respectively. The t
values of the coeﬃcients are included in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcance at the level of 10% or less.
** Signiﬁcance at the level of 5% or less.
*** Signiﬁcance at the level of 1% or less.
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ations. This allows them to ensure that they have a ﬁrm grasp of the control rights so that other shareholders
or managers do not harm their interests. These large shareholders have both the ability and willingness to
obtain access to information. In particular, the largest shareholder often plays a central role in corporate gov-
ernance, as he or she can appoint board members and managers. Therefore, his or her trading should have
relatively high information content.
In Fig. 3, we use the estimated coeﬃcients of the NPR6 model (including BR6 and BR12) to calculate the
predicted FR6 for each month and then compare the predicted FR6 curve with the corresponding actual FR6
curve. As shown in Fig. 3, the predicted FR6 values based on both the executive and large shareholder models
match closely with the actual FR6 value. The results suggest that the predictability of aggregate insider trading
is very high.5.2. Empirical tests of the direction of trade
To further determine whether buying or selling has more predictive power, we divide the transactions into
“buy” and “sell” and replace the NPR with LNBUY6 and LNSELL6, as shown in Table 10. Because the-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
20
07
-0
1
20
07
-0
3
20
07
-0
5
20
07
-0
7
20
07
-0
9
20
07
-1
1
20
08
-0
1
20
08
-0
3
20
08
-0
5
20
08
-0
7
20
08
-0
9
20
08
-1
1
20
09
-0
1
20
09
-0
3
20
09
-0
5
20
09
-0
7
20
09
-0
9
20
09
-1
1
20
10
-0
1
20
10
-0
3
20
10
-0
5
20
10
-0
7
20
10
-0
9
20
10
-1
1
20
11
-0
1
20
11
-0
3
20
11
-0
5
Figure 3. Comparison of actual and projected future market returns. Note: True-FR6: the actual FR6 (six-month-ahead market returns).
Mgpredict-FR6: predicted FR6 (six-month-ahead market returns) using the executive NPR6 model. Shpredict-FR6: predicted FR6 (six-
month-ahead market returns) using the large shareholder NPR6 model.
Table 10
Predictive power by trading direction for the executive sample.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FR6 FR6 FR6 FR6
Intercept 1.003 1.864*** 0.0918 2.159***
(0.82) (2.91) (0.07) (3.93)
LNBUY6 0.0548 0.0059
(0.82) (0.09)
LNSELL6 0.0917*** 0.105***
(2.92) (3.91)
BR6 0.597*** 0.659***
(3.61) (4.59)
BR12 0.275*** 0.305***
(2.96) (4.06)
Adj. R2 0.006 0.125 0.171 0.365
F 0.67 8.55 4.63 11.14
N 54 54 54 54
Model (1) vs. (2) (3) vs. (4)
Vuong Z 2.328** 2.470**
p-Value 0.020 0.014
Note: LNBUY6 (LNSELL6) is the natural logarithm of the total amount of executives’ buying (selling) transactions over the past six
months. The Vuong test examines the signiﬁcance of the diﬀerences in terms of the Adj. R2 value.
* Signiﬁcance at the level of 10% or less.
** Signiﬁcance at the level of 5% or less.
*** Signiﬁcance at the level of 1% or less.
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 !Table 10 compares the executives’ purchases and sales. The coeﬃcients of LNSELL6 are signiﬁcant in both
models 2 and 4, with or without BR6 and BR12. In contrast, the coeﬃcients of LNBUY6 are not signiﬁcant in
models 1 and 3. Next, we use the Vuong test (1989) to examine the signiﬁcance of the diﬀerences in R2 values.
The results suggest that aggregate executive selling activities have more predictive power than buying activi-
ties. These ﬁndings are diﬀerent from prior studies that use U.S. market data. Prior studies of the U.S. market
have consistently found that executive buying has more information content than selling. In the U.S., equity
incentives are often the largest components of executive compensation. Executives often decrease their hold-
ings for liquidity or diversiﬁcation reasons, which dilutes the information content of selling. In contrast, their
buying is usually driven by private information and has high information content. However, executives in the
Chinese A-share market do not have equivalent equity incentives like their counterparts in the United States.
Executive holdings are also often very low,3 so selling is more likely to be based on an information advantage.
In contrast, executive buying is sparse and often occurs for diverse reasons. For example, executives may
increase their holdings for political reasons,4 to increase the stock price shortly before a seasoned equity oﬀer-
ing5 or because doing so is mandated by equity incentive plans.6 These types of purchases undoubtedly dilute
the information content of executive buying (Zhu et al., 2011a,b).e average stock ownership of board directors, executives and supervisors in companies listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange was
.06% in 2008.
r example, during the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis, large central state-owned listed companies actively responded to the call to maintain
al market stability by increasing their insider holdings of listed companies.
mpanies may want to take advantage of market participants who follow executive purchases to increase their holdings and therefore
ck price shortly before a seasoned equity oﬀering.
ecutive equity incentive programs sometimes mandate that annual bonuses be used to purchase a company’s stock.
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holder LNBUY6 are signiﬁcant and the Adj-R2 values of models 1 and 3 are not low, the higher coeﬃcients of
LNSELL6 and the higher Adj-R2 values in the LNSELL6 models suggest that large shareholder selling has a
much stronger predictive power than buying. Large shareholders and especially those in central state-owned
companies may respond to political calls to increase their holdings during an economic crisis or in strategically
important industries. Large shareholders may also increase their holdings during a control rights competition.
These non-information-driven buying activities dilute the information content of aggregate shareholder
buying.
5.3. The eﬀect of an information hierarchy on the predictive power of insider trading
Executives can be divided into three categories: managers, directors and supervisors. Each of these catego-
ries has a diﬀerent position on the information hierarchy. As shown in Table 12, based on the results of the
Vuong tests and the signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients, regardless of whether BR6 and BR12 are controlled for,
managers have the strongest trading predictability, followed by directors and then supervisors. These ﬁndings
coincide with the order of the executive information hierarchy discussed earlier. Involvement in business oper-
ations and the information hierarchy signiﬁcantly aﬀect the predictive power of insider trading. This ﬁnding
strongly supports the argument that insider trading is beyond simple contrarian trading and is stronger mainly
due to the macro information advantage insiders have based on their operational involvement.
We now divide large shareholders into two categories: controlling and important shareholders. These two
categories have diﬀerent positions on the information hierarchy. Small shareholders with less than 5% own-
ership and no relation to the largest shareholders as a benchmark are also included, as they normally do
not have an information advantage (see Table 13).
Regardless of whether BR6 and BR12 are controlled for, the predictability of controlling shareholder trad-
ing is signiﬁcantly stronger than that of important shareholder trading. When BR6 and BR12 are not con-
trolled for, the Adj. R2 value of the important shareholder model is only 6.2%, and that of the controlling
shareholder model is 35.5%. Because NPR6-Smallsh is not signiﬁcant, small shareholders’ trading activities
have no information content. The descending predictive power of trading belonging to controlling, importantTable 11
Predictive power by trading direction for the large shareholder sample.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FR6 FR6 FR6 FR6
Intercept 1.114*** 7.170*** 1.896*** 6.802***
(3.45) (7.09) (3.91) (7.52)
LNBUY6 0.0979*** 0.162***
(3.46) (3.96)
LNSELL6 0.489*** 0.464***
(7.10) (7.51)
BR6 0.368** 0.482***
(2.39) (4.27)
BR12 0.0477 0.170***
(0.43) (2.81)
Adj. R2 0.172 0.482 0.368 0.610
F 12.00 50.39 11.31 28.64
N 54 54 54 54
Model (1) vs. (2) (3) vs. (4)
Vuong Z 2.210** 2.725***
p-Value 0.027 0.006
Note: LNBUY6 (LNSELL6) is the natural logarithm of the total amount of large shareholder purchases (sales) over the past six months.
* Signiﬁcance at the level of 10% or less.
** Signiﬁcance at the level of 5% or less.
*** Signiﬁcance at the level of 1% or less.
Table 12
Predictive power of trading by executive type.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FR6 FR6 FR6 FR6 FR6 FR6
Intercept 0.251*** 0.381*** 0.0647 0.276*** 0.464*** 0.374
(4.24) (3.52) (0.28) (5.88) (4.98) (1.56)
NPR6_Manager 0.527*** 0.568***
(5.48) (7.37)
NPR6_Director 0.513*** 0.642***
(3.84) (5.22)
NPR6_Supervisor 0.0802 0.466
(0.26) (1.52)
BR6 0.663*** 0.654*** 0.705***
(5.86) (4.97) (4.05)
BR12 0.254*** 0.189** 0.349***
(4.29) (2.67) (3.65)
Adj. R2 0.354 0.206 0.018 0.603 0.463 0.207
F 30.07 14.74 0.07 27.80 16.22 5.61
N 54 54 54 54 54 54
Model (1) vs. (2) (2) vs. (3) (1) vs. (3) (4) vs. (5) (5) vs. (6) (4) vs. (6)
Vuong Z 1.320 2.359** 3.043*** 1.940* 2.814*** 4.134***
p-Value 0.187 0.018 0.002 0.052 0.005 0.000
Note:NPR6-Manager is the net purchasing ratio for managers. NPR6-Director is the net purchasing ratio for directors. NPR6-Supervisor
is the net purchasing ratio for supervisors. FR6 is the dependent variable. The Vuong tests examine the signiﬁcance of the diﬀerences in
Adj. R2 values.
* Signiﬁcance at the level of 10% or less.
** Signiﬁcance at the level of 5% or less.
*** Signiﬁcance at the level of 1% or less.
Table 13
Predictive power of trading by shareholder type.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FR6 FR6 FR6 FR6 FR6 FR6
Intercept 0.329*** 0.987** 0.0730 0.358*** 1.903*** 0.0978
(4.65) (2.10) (0.73) (6.05) (3.85) (1.00)
NPR6-Control 0.474*** 0.554***
(5.49) (6.88)
NPR6-Important 1.086** 2.114***
(2.12) (3.83)
NPR6-Smallsh 0.125 0.149
(0.88) (0.94)
BR6 0.538*** 0.735*** 0.607***
(4.59) (4.98) (3.75)
BR12 0.106 0.190** 0.245**
(1.61) (2.42) (2.67)
Adj. R2 0.355 0.062 0.004 0.574 0.358 0.185
F 30.16 4.50 0.77 24.80 10.87 5.01
N 54 54 54 54 54 54
Model (1) vs. (2) (1) vs. (3) (2) vs. (3) (4) vs. (5) (4) vs. (6) (5) vs. (6)
Vuong Z 2.592*** 2.873*** 1.438 1.771* 3.524*** 2.103**
p-Value 0.010 0.004 0.150 0.077 0.000 0.036
Note: NPR6-Control is the net purchasing ratio for controlling shareholders. NPR6-Important is the net purchasing ratio for important
shareholders. NPR6-Smallsh is the net purchasing ratio for small shareholders (less than 5% ownership and no relation to the largest
shareholder). The Vuong tests examine the signiﬁcance of the diﬀerences in Adj. R2 values.
* Signiﬁcance at the level of 10% or less.
** Signiﬁcance at the level of 5% or less.
*** Signiﬁcance at the level of 1% or less.
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ther validates the argument that the predictability of insider trading is a result of the insiders’ macro informa-
tion advantage.5.4. Eﬀect of corporate governance on the predictive power of insider trading
To investigate the eﬀect of corporate governance on executive trading, we divide companies into three cat-
egories: private-, local state- and central state-owned. As shown in Table 14, based on the signiﬁcance of the
coeﬃcients and the Vuong tests of the Adj. R2 values, the predictive power of executive trading is the weakest
for central state-owned companies. Furthermore, it is slightly higher for local state-owned companies than for
private-owned companies, but the diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant. Table 15 exhibits the results of a sensitivity test
where the NPR ratio is calculated using the number of transactions instead of the amount of yuan. The regres-
sion results are consistent with those shown in Table 14.
The preceding ﬁndings are partly consistent with Hypothesis 3. As expected in Hypothesis 3, given the hid-
den but strong administrative control, the executives in central state-owned companies are restrained from
trading for proﬁt. The “quasi-oﬃcial” status of these executives weakens their proﬁt motivation, forcing them
to give up opportunities to proﬁt from their macro information advantage. This explains the relatively low
predictive power of aggregate trading by this type of executive.
The predictive power of executive trading between local state- and private-owned companies is not signif-
icantly diﬀerent. Because trading based on macro information advantage would not harm the interests of large
shareholders as seriously as trading based on company-level private information, large shareholders do not
monitor it, even in private-owned companies. Therefore the diﬀerence in shareholder oversight between local
state-owned companies and private-owned companies has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on executive trading based on a
macro information advantage and the predictability of executive trading. However, as reported by FidrmucTable 14
Eﬀect of corporate governance on the predictive power of executive trading.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FR6-Private FR6-Local FR6-Central FR6-Private FR6-Local FR6-Central
Intercept 0.990*** 0.307*** 0.341*** 0.987*** 0.269*** 0.397***
(7.09) (6.19) (4.44) (7.08) (6.02) (5.27)
NPR6-Private 1.124*** 1.151***
(6.53) (6.21)
NPR6-Local 0.586*** 0.753***
(6.93) (8.42)
NPR6-Central 0.429*** 0.483***
(4.14) (4.97)
BR6-Portfolio 0.205* 0.293*** 0.404***
(1.90) (3.15) (3.30)
BR12-Portfolio 0.0464 0.0343 0.195***
(0.70) (0.58) (3.00)
Adj. R2 0.440 0.470 0.233 0.461 0.600 0.356
F 42.70 48.03 17.10 16.12 27.53 10.77
N 54 54 54 54 54 54
Model (2) vs. (1) (2) vs. (3) (1) vs. (3) (5) vs. (4) (5) vs. (6) (4) vs. (6)
Vuong Z 0.725 2.646*** 1.738* 1.466 2.121** 1.662*
p-Value 0.469 0.008 0.082 0.143 0.034 0.097
Note: NPR6-Private is the net purchasing ratio for executives in private-owned companies. NPR6-Local is the net purchasing ratio for
executives in local state-owned companies. NPR6-Central is the net purchasing ratio for executives in central state-owned companies.
BR6-Portfolio and BR12-Portfolio correspond with the historical return of the company group. For example, when the dependent variable
is FR6-Private, the BR6-Portfolio is BR6-private. The Vuong tests examine the signiﬁcance of the diﬀerences in Adj. R2 values.
* Signiﬁcance at the level of 10% or less.
** Signiﬁcance at the level of 5% or less.
*** Signiﬁcance at the level of 1% or less.
Table 15
Eﬀect of corporate governance on the predictive power of executive trading (sensitivity test).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FR6-Private FR6-Local FR6-Central FR6-Private FR6-Local FR6-Central
Intercept 0.492*** 0.176*** 0.139** 0.544*** 0.116** 0.214***
(4.89) (3.60) (2.25) (5.72) (2.28) (3.34)
TRNPR6-Private 0.700*** 0.830***
(4.23) (4.76)
TRNPR6-Local 0.622*** 0.897***
(4.70) (5.85)
TRNPR6-Central 0.234 0.540***
(1.55) (3.22)
BR6-Portfolio 0.388*** 0.378*** 0.571***
(3.16) (3.33) (3.56)
BR12-Portfolio 0.131* 0.00702 0.238***
(1.86) (0.10) (3.16)
Adj. R2 0.242 0.285 0.026 0.343 0.426 0.203
F 17.91 22.12 2.39 10.21 14.13 5.50
N 54 54 54 54 54 54
Model (2) vs. (1) (1) vs. (3) (2) vs. (3) (5) vs. (4) (5) vs. (6) (4) vs. (6)
Vuong Z 0.869 1.797* 1.925* 1.4127 1.850* 1.127
p-Value 0.385 0.072 0.054 0.158 0.064 0.260
Note: TRNPR6 is a net purchasing ratio measure similar to NPR6, except it is calculated based on the number of transactions instead of
the amount of yuan. It is equal to the net purchase transactions within the past six months divided by the total transactions in the same six
months.
* Signiﬁcance at the level of 10% or less.
** Signiﬁcance at the level of 5% or less.
*** Signiﬁcance at the level of 1% or less.
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insider information. When there is strong large-shareholder oversight, the proﬁtability of executive trading is
lower than that for executives in companies with dispersed ownership.
Table 16 examines the eﬀect of corporate governance on large shareholder trading. The predictive power of
large shareholder trading in private-owned companies is strongest when historical returns are not controlled
for. As shown in model 1, when the NPR6-Private is used to predict FR6, the model can explain 54.4% of the
portfolio returns. In contrast, the NPR6-Local model (2) and the NPR6-Central model (3) explain only 18.3%
and 34.4% of the variation in the portfolio returns, respectively. When historical returns are controlled for, the
NPR6-Private model (4) still has higher explanatory power than the NPR6-Local model (5). However, there is
no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the Adj. R2 values between the NPR6-Private model (4) and the NPR6-Central
model (6), partially due to the increased explanation power of BR6 in the NPR6-Central model (6). These
ﬁndings are consistent with Hypothesis 4. Because large shareholders in private-owned companies have stron-
ger proﬁt motivations and active roles in business operations, the information content of their trading is sig-
niﬁcantly higher than that of large shareholders in state-owned companies.
5.5. Eﬀect of company size on the predictive power of insider trading
Several studies examine the eﬀect of company size on the information content of insider trading (Seyhun,
1992; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001). To be consistent with those studies, we examine the size eﬀect and the
results are shown in Tables 17 and 18.
The predictive power of large company executive trading is signiﬁcantly lower than that of small- and med-
ium-sized companies. This ﬁnding is consistent with the prior literature. Because large companies tend to oﬀer
more public disclosures and can attract more attention from the public and professional investors, the chance
of their stock being mispriced is smaller. As a result, executives in large companies have less private informa-
tion and fewer mispricing opportunities. In addition, the literature consistently ﬁnds that the executive trading
Table 16
Eﬀect of corporate governance on the predictive power of large shareholder trading.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FR6-Private FR6-Local FR6-Central FR6-Private FR6-Local FR6-Central
Intercept 3.337*** 0.961*** 0.687*** 3.533*** 1.092*** 0.837***
(8.28) (3.94) (5.74) (8.54) (3.95) (7.73)
NPR6-Private 3.437*** 3.697***
(8.01) (8.15)
NPR6-Local 1.041*** 1.256***
(3.59) (3.50)
NPR6-Central 0.781*** 1.093***
(5.36) (7.19)
BR6-Portfolio 0.226** 0.251* 0.433***
(2.40) (1.93) (4.12)
BR12-Portfolio 0.0201 0.0283 0.0258
(0.34) (0.33) (0.43)
Adj. R2 0.544 0.183 0.344 0.590 0.224 0.527
F 64.18 12.86 28.74 26.38 6.09 20.70
N 54 54 54 54 54 54
Model (1) vs. (2) (2) vs. (3) (1) vs. (3) (4) vs. (5) (5) vs. (6) (4) vs. (6)
Vuong Z 2.990*** 1.500 1.904* 2.713*** 2.041** 0.127
p-Value 0.003 0.134 0.057 0.007 0.041 0.899
Note:NPR6-Private is the net purchasing ratio for large shareholders in private-owned companies. NPR6-Local is the net purchasing ratio
for large shareholders in local state-owned companies. NPR6-Central is the net purchasing ratio for large shareholders in central state-
owned companies. BR6-Portfolio and BR12-Portfolio correspond with the historical return of the company group. The Vuong tests
examine the signiﬁcance of the diﬀerences in Adj. R2 values.
* Signiﬁcance at the level of 10% or less.
** Signiﬁcance at the level of 5% or less.
*** Signiﬁcance at the level of 1% or less.
Table 17
Eﬀect of company size on the predictive power of executive trading.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FR6-Small FR6-Medium FR6-Large FR6-Small FR6-Medium FR6-Large
Intercept 0.649*** 0.917*** 0.437*** 0.653*** 0.907*** 0.526***
(7.96) (8.91) (3.30) (8.44) (8.69) (4.27)
NPR6-Small 0.764*** 0.795***
(7.85) (7.93)
NPR6-Medium 1.167*** 1.186***
(8.37) (7.85)
NPR6-Large 0.446** 0.639***
(2.62) (3.59)
BR6-Portfolio 0.267*** 0.116 0.493***
(2.71) (1.22) (3.60)
BR12-Portfolio 0.0756 0.0127 0.129*
(1.19) (0.21) (1.89)
Adj. R2 0.538 0.566 0.100 0.584 0.566 0.260
F 61.61 70.11 6.87 25.36 24.07 7.21
N 53 54 54 53 54 54
Model (1) vs. (2) (2) vs. (3) (1) vs. (3) (4) vs. (5) (5) vs. (6) (4) vs. (6)
Vuong Z 0.342 4.015*** 4.254*** 0.626 2.569** 2.839***
p-Value 0.732 0.0001 0.000 0.532 0.010 0.005
Note: NPR6-Small, NPR6-Medium and NPR6-Large are the net purchasing ratios of executive trading for small, medium-sized and large
companies, respectively. Company size is determined by the market value at the beginning of the year. BR6-Portfolio and BR12-Portfolio
correspond with the historical returns of the company group. The Vuong tests examine the signiﬁcance of the diﬀerences in Adj. R2 values.
* Signiﬁcance at the level of 10% or less.
** Signiﬁcance at the level of 5% or less.
*** Signiﬁcance at the level of 1% or less.
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Table 18
Eﬀect of company size on the predictive power of large shareholder trading.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FR6-Small FR6-Medium FR6-Large FR6-Small FR6-Medium FR6-Large
Intercept 1.719*** 2.142*** 0.890*** 1.803*** 2.471*** 1.320***
(5.34) (7.03) (4.55) (5.74) (7.34) (6.76)
NPR6-Small 1.792*** 1.800***
(5.11) (5.32)
NPR6-Medium 2.257*** 2.709***
(6.73) (6.91)
NPR6-Large 1.098*** 1.947***
(4.07) (6.26)
BR6-Portfolio 0.0936 0.151 0.434***
(0.78) (1.49) (3.88)
BR12-Portfolio 0.194*** 0.0633 0.0462
(2.64) (0.90) (0.69)
Adj. R2 0.322 0.455 0.227 0.397 0.505 0.478
F 26.14 45.27 16.55 12.64 19.00 17.16
N 54 54 54 54 54 54
Model (1) vs. (2) (2) vs. (3) (1) vs. (3) (4) vs. (5) (5) vs. (6) (4) vs. (6)
Vuong Z 0.854 2.350** 1.624 0.941 0.487 0.254
p-Value 0.393 0.019 0.104 0.347 0.627 0.800
Note: NPR6-Small, NPR6-Medium and NPR6-Large are the net purchasing ratios of large shareholder trading for small, medium-sized
and large companies, respectively. BR6-Portfolio and BR12-Portfolio correspond with the historical returns of the company group. The
Vuong tests examine the signiﬁcance of the diﬀerences in Adj. R2 values.
* Signiﬁcance at the level of 10% or less.
** Signiﬁcance at the level of 5% or less.
*** Signiﬁcance at the level of 1% or less.
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of small companies.
Without controlling for historical returns, the predictive power of large shareholder trading in large com-
panies is signiﬁcantly smaller than that of medium-sized companies. When BR6 and BR12 are controlled for,
company size has no eﬀect on the predictive power of shareholder trading. Thus, the eﬀect of company size is
more noticeable in executive trading than in shareholder trading.
We conduct a variety of sensitivity tests. First, we use the number of shares traded and the number of trans-
actions as alternative measures to the amount of yuan in calculating the NPR index, and the conclusions stay
the same. Second, we use FR9 and FR12 as alternative dependent variables, and the empirical results are con-
sistent with the use of FR6. Third, given the signiﬁcant diﬀerences in turnover, company size and listing his-
tory between the main board, small-cap and growth enterprise markets, we remove the small-cap and growth
enterprise markets, leaving only the main board market, and ﬁnd that all of the regression results are robust.
We use another method to consider the eﬀects of diﬀerent markets on the results. We use the small-cap market
index to calculate the future and prior market returns, and ﬁnd that insider trading in companies listed on the
small-cap and growth enterprise markets also has strong predictability for future small-cap market returns.
Fourth, Zhang and Zeng (2011) ﬁnd that the relatives of executives can serve as an alternate and implicit insi-
der trading method to avoid strict monitoring and that relative trading has a similar timing ability. We con-
duct a sensitivity test by using NPR6-Relatives in the models and ﬁnd that relative trading cannot predict
future market returns. Although relatives do not seem to have a macroeconomic information advantage, their
information advantage may be limited to the company level.
6. Conclusions
Using Chinese A-share market data taken from January 2007 to August 2011, we examine the predictive
power of aggregate insider trading on future market returns from a macro perspective. We ﬁnd that after
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prior six months predicts 66% (72.7%) of market returns twelve months in advance. The predictive power
is caused by insiders’ information advantage in predicting macroeconomic trends and detecting deviations
in stock market valuation. Compared with the results found in the U.S. market, aggregate insider trading
in the A-share market has a stronger predictability, which may highlight the severity of insider trading in
the A-shares market or indicate that the market may be more prone to systematic valuation bias to create
more opportunities for insider trading. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that the information hierarchy and corporate
governance have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the information content of aggregate insider trading. The trading of
insiders who are more involved in business operations and at higher positions in the information hierarchy
have signiﬁcantly more predictive power. The corporate ownership structure also has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on
insider trading. The predictive power of executive trading is weakest for central state-owned companies.
Although there is a lack of eﬀective large-shareholder oversight, the implicit administrative control in central
state-owned companies becomes an alternative mechanism for curbing executive trading. Large shareholders
in private-owned companies have stronger incentives to beneﬁt from insider trading and have more power to
control business operations. As such, the predictive power of their trading is signiﬁcantly higher than that of
large shareholders in state-owned companies.
The relationship between insider trading and information advantage and how external regulation and cor-
porate governance aﬀect insider trading have been important issues for regulators, academia and investors.
This study complements prior studies by examining an emerging market and investigating how institutional
context and corporate governance aﬀect insider trading. It provides interesting ﬁndings that are diﬀerent from
those observed in mature markets. For example, it ﬁnds that the trading activities of large shareholders in the
Chinese A-share market have much higher information content than those in mature markets. The ﬁndings
diﬀer mainly due to China’s institutional background and corporate governance. Due to the weak investor
protection in the Chinese A-share market, large shareholders tend to be actively involved with business oper-
ations and thus become important insiders who cannot be ignored. This study also further examines the rela-
tionship between corporate governance and insider trading. We ﬁnd that private- and state-owned companies
face diﬀerent agency problems and governance structures, resulting in signiﬁcant diﬀerences in insider trading
behavior. The information content of the trading of executives in central state-owned companies is lowest
because they are subject to implicit but strong administrative control. This suggests that executive trading
is inﬂuenced by not only large shareholders’ oversight, but also another implicit informal monitoring system
such as the administrative control of an organization.
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